Will the ‘nuclear taboo’ survive?

Written by: Valeria Puga Álvarez 

The war in Ukraine has heightened US-Russia tensions reviving fears of looming nuclear apocalypse. Amidst weakened institutional frameworks and the great powers’ will to preserve the status quo, the non-proliferation doctrine is under increasing pressure. 

Adapted versions of this article appear on the webpages of: 

The Research Center for the History of Transformations of Vienna (RECET) on this link and 

of Eurozine on this link 

Since 1945, the so-called ‘nuclear taboo’ has been grounded on what British diplomat, historian and International Relations theorist, Edward H. Carr referred to as “the insoluble problem of finding a moral justification for the use of force.” [1]  Nuclear weapons are unparalleled in terms of the scale and scope of their destructive power and the fallout from their use has proven to have abhorrent consequences for the victims across generations. The expression ‘nuclear taboo’ has mainly been used to describe the self-restraint of nuclear states in using their arsenals. If we broaden this term to include the self-restraint in acquiring these weapons by non-nuclear states, then this taboo might seem weaker than previously imagined. 

Escalating tensions

The escalation of tensions between nuclear states like the United States, Russia, and China has revived the fear of a nuclear apocalypse. The recent Russian military operations in Ukraine, mainly in response to the Kremlin’s concerns over the NATO’s enlargement to the East, has stoked fears regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons, as well as the possibility of proliferation. 

According to a study published by Nature Food in August, with “less than 3% of the world’s stockpiles” a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the US “could kill three-fourths of the world’s population” in two years. In fact, the mutually assured destruction could happen with the use of even fewer or ‘limited’ tactical nuclear weapons. 

Establishing the nuclear taboo

After the US nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki raised a death toll of 210.000, the Americans once again considered the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. However, it held back to avoid a political backlash amidst the rise of an anti-nuclear sentiment around the globe. As political scientist Nina Tannenwald has demonstrated, the (still alive) ‘nuclear taboo’ has not only responded to changing strategic circumstances such as those in the Korean and Vietnam wars, but it has taken years of collective effort by states, civil society actors, and international institutions to stigmatize the use of the bomb. 

To what extent has this ‘nuclear taboo’ been institutionalized and formalized to punish its violators? Is it still strong enough a constraint to hold back belligerent states from dropping the bomb or providing it to one’s allies? The deterrence mind-set “defined as the attempt to keep an opponent from adopting a certain course of action by posing risks which will seem to him out of proportion to any gains to be achieved” [2]  is still embraced by nuclear states, despite history has shown its limitations, for example the possession of nuclear weapons is not enough to prevent a military conventional attack. While nuclear abolitionists have made gains on their agenda – for example, through the enforcement of Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2020 – nuclear states have pursued the policy of preserving the status quo in their favour. This means modernizing their arsenals and brandishing the threat of using them as they please. The abolitionists oppose such policies in favour of fully eliminating these weapons. The gap between these two camps has not narrowed. From this perspective, the meaning of peace is a polysemous battlefield. 

The development and internationalization of the ‘nuclear taboo’ has been based on the agency of international institutions such as the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Non-nuclear states have also contributed in strengthening the taboo, for example, through the creation of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) and the establishment of institutions like the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), often dismissed by International Relations scholars [3]. Nonetheless, without the commitment of nuclear weapon states and their tacit acceptance of the taboo, the taboo’s prevalence until today would not have been feasible. 

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which has served as the backbone of the non-proliferation agenda, convenes a Review Conference every 5 years. These conferences are meant to harmonize the contrasting international perspectives on dealing with the existence of nuclear weapons. Since only five nations have the right to possess nuclear weapons, the legitimacy of the treaty is often questioned due to the disproportionate decision-making power in the hands of unassailable and ‘unpunishable’ actors. In other words, “the nuclear taboo” has a problem of incommensurability with the current norms because it has not been translated into a compelling legal substance. The nuclear states’ staunch opposition to the TPNW has been yet another indicator that the nuclear have-nots’ endeavour to abolish the current status quo may prove chimeric. 

Weakened institutions

The last Review Conference concluded on August 26, 2022 without any consensus regarding the final document. This time, the tensions crystallized by the war in Ukraine made this outcome predictable. Russia rejected the statements about the “grave concern” over the military activities around the Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Zaporizhia. These unsatisfactory outcomes - nurtured by the open hostility between the US and Russia - are the latest additions to a long list of setbacks facing the modest (and unbalanced) disarmament and non-proliferation agendas. 

Certainly, the ‘nuclear taboo’ is in one of its darkest hours due to the weakening of the institutional scaffolding that promoted it. Moreover, the absence of a sort of ‘red telephone’ or a channel of dialogue between confronting nuclear powers has exacerbated the situation. The expiration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 after the US withdrawal also dealt a blow. 

In some cases, the use of nuclear weapons on a battlefield might offer some tactical advantage, but it would result in a much larger humanitarian and political disaster. However, what the two nuclear adversaries, the US and Russia, can still do is provide nuclear weapons to their allies. This undertaking would be a flagrant violation of the NPT, which forbids nuclear-weapon transfers, and it would also be a setback of the “nuclear taboo” triggering a proliferation chain of unknown results. 

The future of non-proliferation

Has the NPT the strength to prevent the above-described outcome when its last conferences have ended up without a final document? Unfortunately, the above-described developments provide enough evidence to conclude that the ‘nuclear taboo’ could be undermined by the potential mushrooming of new nuclear states amid weakened institutional structures. To preserve the ethos of this taboo from the periphery of power would mean a permanent political and institutional battle with nuclear powers. 

The Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, which demand the total absence of nuclear weapons in delimited regional areas under the IAEA’s supervision, have proved to be relevant until nowadays in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states [4]. The restrictions that they enshrine, including activities such as nuclear production, manufacturing, testing and deployment, have helped to reinforce the expanded notion of the nuclear taboo and, in the current belligerent scenario, they could halt a possible chain of proliferation. Although conflictual zones like the Middle East and East Asia are not covered by NWFZs, amidst the context of a weakening of the NPT, the NWFZs might play the role of the last bulwark of the non-proliferation utopia. 

Sources

[1] Edward Hallett Carr. The twenty years’ crisis, 1919-1939. An introduction to the studies of International Relations. 2001 reprinted edition. New York: Perennial, 1939, p. 100. 

[2] Henry Kissinger. Nuclear weapons and foreign policy. London: Routledge, 1957, 1984, p. 96. 

[3] Amitav Acharya. “Norm subsidiarity and regional order: sovereignty, regionalism and rule-making in the third world” In: Rethinking power, institutions and ideas in world politics, Whose IR?, London–New York: Routledge. 2014, pp. 217 – 249. 

[4] The Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in inhabited areas include Latin American and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, most of Africa, Central Asia and Mongolia.

Posibilidades de un nuevo acuerdo nuclear iraní

Entrevista para Radio Francia Internacional

1. ¿Qué tan factible es que se llegue a un acuerdo sobre el problema nuclear iraní con la nueva propuesta de la Unión Europea? 

Es relativamente factible, pero el acuerdo final probablemente se alargue en su negociación fundamentalmente por las tensas relaciones y líneas rojas que mantienen los dos grandes antagonistas implicados Estados Unidos e Irán, que no han mejorado como se esperaba con Biden. Por un lado, Estados Unidos, abandonó el acuerdo de 2018 durante el gobierno de Donald Trump porque consideraba que había sido mal negociado en tiempos de Barack Obama, porque se establecían períodos fijos y no indefinidos tanto a las reducciones de enriquecimiento de uranio en ciertas instalaciones como la de Fordo como a la importación de tecnología de misiles balísticos, que tradicionalmente han sido dirigidos por la guardia iraní. Además, Trump criticaba duramente el descongelamiento de los 100 mil millones de dólares que Irán tenía en el extranjero, incluso dijo que servirían para propagar el terrorismo en la región, una postura que fue públicamente apoyada por Israel, que como se conoce es un país enemigo de Irán, nuclearmente armado y no parte del Tratado de No proliferación Nuclear (TNP) como sí lo es Irán. Ahora, si bien Biden rescindió de reimponer las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas contra Irán el año pasado y dio luz verde para sentarse a la mesa a renegociar el acuerdo, su retórica no ha sido radicalmente diferente a la de Trump y ha habido cierta continuidad ahí, en julio de este año por ejemplo durante su gira por el Oriente Medio dijo claramente que Estados Unidos está preparado para usar todos los elementos de su poder nacional, incluyendo la fuerza como último recurso” para evitar que Irán tenga armas nucleares y nuevamente reflotó la cuestión de que Irán usa a organizaciones terroristas para sus fines. A lo que Irán siempre ha respondido que no se trata de organizaciones terroristas sino de resistencia frente a las agresiones de Israel y EUA. Cabe recordar que Biden era vicepresidente de Obama cuando se alcanzó el acuerdo en 2015. Por tanto, es posible que Estados Unidos renegocie de manera maximalista los plazos y las cantidades en la reducción de material fisible y en la transformación de las instalaciones de enriquecimiento de uranio, pero al insistir en que Irán promueve el terrorismo, refuerza y justifica la inclusión de la Guardia Revolucionaria de Irán en su lista de organizaciones terroristas desde 2019, así como las sanciones que les ha impuesto lo que bloquea este nuevo intento de acuerdo por la importancia militar y simbólica de la guardia para Irán. Sin duda ésta es una de las "tres cuestiones pendientes” a las que el ministro de Exteriores iraní, Abdolahian, hacía referencia ayer con miras a cerrar el pacto nuclear, que la UE busca salvar con su propuesta de la que aún no se conocen los detalles.

2. ¿Qué tanto pesan las sanciones contra Irán (y sobre todo contra los Guardianes de la Revolución) en la resolución de este diferendo? 

Fuente: Arms Control Association

Las sanciones son el principal escollo para alcanzar el acuerdo e incluso para sentarse a la mesa a negociar. Hay que tener en cuenta que Irán tuvo dos años de recesión debido a las sanciones económicas, financieras y comerciales impuestas por Estados Unidos, profundizadas por Donald Trump y sostenidas aún por Joe Biden. No obstante, no han provocado el colapso de la economía iraní, sobre todo porque Irán lleva 40 años y más de experiencia haciéndole frente a todo tipo de sanciones. Las sanciones ya no le afectan igual que en los 70s y 80s, cuando su PBI per cápita podía caer hasta un 50%. Hay que mencionar también que en el último tiempo su economía se ha recuperado gracias al alza de los precios del petróleo. Por tanto, si bien las sanciones aún afectan el día a día de la población, el gobierno de Irán ha logrado que su efecto se reduzca y con ello, las posibilidades de un cambio de régimen por descontento como Estados Unidos ha pretendido por años. Hay que mencionar que de las 107 sanciones que la administración Biden ha impuesto a Irán, 86 de ellas, es decir unas tres cuartas partes, se han aplicado contra los guardianes de la revolución y sus allegados. Para que sepa la audiencia, la guardia revolucionaria iraní, es una unidad de élite con un amplio alcance en la economía de ese país. hay que mencionar en primer lugar, que Irán ha sido enfático al exigir la remoción de este grupo de la lista de organizaciones terroristas que mantiene Estados Unidos, como requisito para sentarse a negociar un nuevo acuerdo nuclear. Esta remoción excede los términos que tendría el acuerdo nuclear, pues es más bien una cuestión bilateral. En tal sentido, si bien Washington no se ha pronunciado oficialmente sobre esto, sí se ha referido al problema de las sanciones. En abril de este año el vocero del departamento de Estado Ned Price dijo categóricamente que si Irán quiere el levantamiento de sanciones que van más allá del acuerdo, debería hacer concesiones a Estados Unidos por fuera del JCPOA. Israel está presionando en ese sentido a Estados Unidos para que mantenga su postura frente a los guardianes de la revolución. A lo que Joe Biden ha cedido. Si bien retirar a los Guardianes de la lista es una facultad que bien la puede hacer el ejecutivo, una supermayoría de senadores tanto republicanos como demócratas emitió una resolución en mayo de este año en oposición a su retiro de la lista y al levantamiento de las sanciones contra ellos, a modo de advertencia para Biden. Por tanto, Es necesario comentarle a la audiencia que la inclusión de los Guardianes de la Revolución en la lista de organizaciones terroristas supone la primera vez en que Estados Unidos nombra a una parte de otro gobierno como tal. Por tanto, el nivel de gravedad en términos, políticos y diplomáticos es mayor que en los casos de otras organizaciones que han sido incluidas sin ser parte de un gobierno oficial. Por tanto, y aunque suene paradójico, no es excesivo decir que el acuerdo nuclear se definirá por cuestiones no nucleares como ésta. 

3. ¿Qué y hasta dónde pueden ceder las partes que negocian? 

Como sucede en otros conflictos internacionales, su resolución depende no solo de los arreglos entre las partes sino de las dinámicas regionales y domésticas. En este caso, como decíamos, alcanzar un nuevo acuerdo nuclear excede el acuerdo en sí y su materia, pues depende principalmente de los entrampamientos bilaterales que hoy por hoy hay entre Estados Unidos e Irán como la cuestión de los guardianes de la revolución, las acusaciones contra Irán de apoyar al terrorismo y las presiones de Israel a favor de acciones maximalistas contra el país persa. Claramente un Irán nuclear disminuiría la hegemonía nuclear que mantiene Israel en Oriente Medio e instalaría un balance militar que desequilibraría por ende a Estados Unidos. No hay que descartar también que un posible acuerdo con Irán podría ayudar políticamente tanto a los norteamericanos como a los europeos después de los resultados conservadores que han tenido en su apoyo a Ucrania frente a Rusia. En el caso hipotético de que se alcancen acuerdos en el terreno nuclear, fijando cantidades, plazos, límites y ofreciendo el levantamiento de ciertas sanciones contra Irán, no será suficiente, porque existe una disputa bilateral yuxtapuesta que está lejos de destrabarse y tanto para Irán como para Estados Unidos la cuestión de los Guardianes de la Revolución es su línea roja. Visto desde este prisma, el objetivo para Estados Unidos no es solo evitar la fabricación de armas nucleares iraníes sino debilitar el rol de potencia regional de este país, algo de lo que está consciente Irán, por lo que buscará además tener garantías de cumplimiento del acuerdo y cuidarse frente a un potencial abandono de Washington. Aparentemente, Irán ha expresado su predisposición a negociar el acuerdo, no obstante, todavía se avizoran sus bloqueos.

Aleccionar al Caribe: recordando la invasión de Estados Unidos a Granada

El Caribe es para los Estados Unidos la “tercera frontera”, un lugar de vital importancia para su seguridad. Esta inevitable geopolítica se agudizó durante la Guerra Fría, en la que la política interna y externa de los países latinoamericanos y caribeños se interpretaban desde el clivaje: comunismo o capitalismo y Unión Soviética o Estados   Unidos.  Los problemas de los países de lo que entonces se llamó ‘Tercer Mundo’ se desplazaron y negaron, limitándolos a disputas de bandos alineados con una de estas ideologías.  Para el Tercer Mundo, la guerra no fue fría, al contrario, fue una guerra caliente y sin tregua.  Los soviéticos y americanos habían definido sus zonas de influencia y Europa fungía como el límite de las tensiones, el resto era tierra de nadie.  Fuera de Europa cualquier cosa era posible.

La alianza de Cuba con la Unión Soviética reconfiguró la política exterior de los Estados Unidos hacia América Latina y el Caribe, en dirección de la ‘doctrina de contención’ de George Kennan, que pretendía impedir a toda costa la expansión del comunismo.  El terrible etnocentrismo americano, su marcada agenda imperialista y su desinterés (y desconocimiento) de los procesos sociales y políticos latinoamericanos llevó a Estados Unidos a cometer innumerables errores estratégicos y políticos, criticados incluso por sus aliados y cuyas consecuencias persisten. La invasión a Granada de 1983 fue un claro ejemplo.

A finales de los setentas los procesos revolucionarios de Nicaragua -liderado por el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN)- y de Granada –comandado por Maurice Bishop del Movimiento New Jewel (NJM)- alentaban a la Revolución Cubana en la causa del socialismo en América Latina.   No obstante, el líder cubano Fidel Castro estaba consciente de las limitaciones militares que existían para continuar el curso.  Cuba se había comprometido a no transferir armas soviéticas a otros países, lo cual era un grave obstáculo para el apoyo revolucionario.

Granada, apenas descolonizada en 1974, era una pequeña isla de 340 km2 con una población de 120 000 habitantes por entonces. Pese al amplio respaldo popular del que gozaba Maurice Bishop, luego de derrocar al gobierno reaccionario de Eric Gairy -un fiel aliado de los Estados Unidos y amigo del dictador chileno Augusto Pinochet-, su defensa militar era débil e inestable.  Su arsenal se reducía a unos 600 a 700 viejos rifles ingleses. En un memorando de una conversación entre Fidel Castro y el secretario general del Partido Comunista de Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov de abril de 1979, se alertaba del peligro de un grupo de 200 a 300 mercenarios extranjeros bien armados que acosaban la isla y buscaban reponer a Gairy en el poder. 

Las amenazas al gobierno de Bishop venían desde fuera y de sus propias filas. Cuba y la Unión Soviética habían decidido apoyar la construcción de un nuevo aeropuerto para fines turísticos, pero los Estados Unidos arguyeron que se trataba de la creación de instalaciones militares para favorecer a los soviéticos.  Casa adentro, el viceprimer ministro Bernard Coard, de tendencia más radical que Bishop, empezó a empoderar a su facción y a ganar posiciones en el Ejército, en el Ministerio de Seguridad y en el Partido. Esto allanó el camino para que en octubre de 1983, Bishop fuera depuesto en contra de la voluntad popular y posteriormente abatido junto a varios de sus colaboradores. Hudson Austin, un militar que había luchado junto a Bishop se autoproclamó primer ministro. En respuesta aquello, la Organización de Estados del Caribe Oriental (OECS) pidió la intervención de los Estados Unidos, Barbados y Jamaica.  Aunque como se expuso, Granada se encontraba bajo acecho desde mucho antes. 

Así, la mañana del 25 de Octubre de 1983, Estados Unidos aterrizaba en suelo granadino.  Se trataba de la primera intervención desde 1965. Junto a los granadinos lucharon soldados cubanos, todos ellos, asistidos por la Unión Soviética, Bulgaria y la RDA principalmente.  A pesar de que la defensa estaba bastante preparada, la superioridad militar de los invasores terminó por doblegarlos.  Ni Canadá, ni Reino Unido apoyaron la invasión.  Asimismo, se comprobó que el pretexto ‘humanitario’ de salvar a estudiantes estadounidenses de medicina que supuestamente estaban en peligro era distorsionado. Para Reagan, Granada era además su trampolín de campaña para la reelección.

Los Estados Unidos consideraron la invasión como un triunfo a pesar de sus fallas técnicas y de protocolo. Sin embargo,  en un encuentro entre el presidente del Consejo de Estado de la República Democrática Alemana (RDA), Erich Honecker y el Comandante Castro en febrero de 1984, Fidel evaluaba la invasión así: “Estados Unidos ha librado una batalla sin éxito contra ese pequeño país. Después de esta invasión, será mucho más difícil atacar a Nicaragua, destruir el movimiento de liberación en El Salvador, o incluso invadir Cuba”. 

La invasión de Granada profundizó la crisis de desconfianza entre América Latina y Estados Unidos que previamente había detonado por el apoyo norteamericano a las atroces dictaduras del Cono Sur y por sus políticas de endeudamiento.  La Declaración de Quito y el Plan de Acción de la Conferencia Económica Latinoamericana, aprobados en enero de 1984 por 30 países, fue un ejemplo de la distancia efectiva que el continente tomaba frente a Washington.

Sin duda, la invasión de Granada tuvo un propósito aleccionador, de disuadir a los países del Caribe de cualquier acercamiento con el comunismo y la Unión Soviética. No obstante, el legado de Maurice Bishop sigue vigente en Granada.  Incluso luego de la invasión, Bishop tenía la simpatía del 80% de los isleños, y hoy indudablemente es un símbolo de revolución y lucha por la justicia social para el Caribe y América Latina.

Piketty and his critics, the undeniable debate over inequality

Since the global financial crisis triggered in 2008, a prominent debate over the inequality has been gaining ground. Not only politicians and scholars have started to lay out their thesis about the disparities across the globe, but also, common citizens in many countries have seen that as one of the greatest dangers in the world . 

In this chiaroscuro scenario, Thomas Piketty published his 577-page book: “The capital in the Twenty-First Century”  in 2013, and as The Economist then claimed it was “an overnight sensation”. No one remained indifferent to this book. Some have enthusiastically embraced this painstaking contribution while others have harshly criticized it.  

To summarize, Piketty in order to explain the historical variations in wealth inequality, establishes an important correlation between two variables: the rate of return on capital (r) and the growth rate (g).  Accordingly to the author, when r exceeds g the inequality increases.  Of course, as he clarifies, it’s “one of the important forces”  With that equation in mind, Piketty analyses three centuries and over 20 countries since the Industrial Revolution.  For the author, inheritance it’s at the centre of this “dysfunctional capitalism”. As a conclusion, Piketty sketches a policy response to tackle with this phenomenon: a progressive global income tax. Having said that, in a brief way, this essay will intend to assess the main critics to the Piketty’s book taking into account the statements of two highly qualified experts: the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz and those of Mark Warshawsky, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center. 

Other factors in the diagnosis of world inequality

Stiglitz, often referred as a progressive economist, has claimed that “Thomas Piketty [got] income inequality wrong” . Stiglitz states that “a large fraction of the increase in wealth is an increase in the value of land, not in one amount of capital goods.[…] in addition to an increase in the wealth/income ratio, is a capitalization of the increase in other kinds of rents, like monopoly rents”. 

As Piketty has highlighted, institutions have played an important role in widening the gap between haves and have-nots. In the same direction, Stiglitz reinforces that perspective by illustrating his assumption over monopoly rents: “we’ve had monetary authorities allowing […] banks to lend more. But this lending has not gone for creating new business […] it has gone to increase the value of land and other fixed resources”. Inevitably, the consequence is that wages don`t have the chance to increase if at the end of the day landing has not gone to productive activities.

Furthermore, for Stiglitz, the “study that Piketty and his associates did on the effect of an increase in taxes on the top 1 percent” is useful to understand the characteristics of that 1%. For example, it enables us to identify if the wealth of that group comes from a hard work and/or from inheritance, as Piketty has often commented.

Stiglitz in his recent book “The price of inequality”  attempts to go further than Piketty.  He asked: “what can we do to reduce inequality of before-tax and transfers income, and what can we do to improve the after-tax and transfers income? In that sense, Piketty only essays a before-tax policy, that is, the progressive global income tax. In this part, Warshawsky marks a hiatus from the idea of taxation as an outstanding solution for reducing inequality. To this author, income tax rates no necessarily have had an impact on income shares, even if they “have steadily increased”. Additionally, Warshawsky considers “Piketty is also quite concerned that tax competition between countries in Europe has led to cuts in corporate tax rates and to the exemption of capital income from the progressive income tax” (11). 

As Stiglitz, Warshawsky recognizes the importance of the empirical basis provided by Piketty’s work. Notwithstanding, this author notes some internal differences in that capital, in his words: “Piketty looks at the role of inheritance versus saving in the accumulation of private wealth” (8). Upon that outlook, Piketty in a certain wayis “stigmatizing” the wealth accumulation.  To support that idea, Warshawsky notes: 

It is surprising that Piketty does not give retirement savings a greater role in explaining recent trends and in projecting the future. […]Retirement savings may explain (by rough estimate) at least half of capital accumulation in the United States, which undercuts Piketty’s explanation that the primary motive of the rich is stockpiling a large inheritance for future generations (9).

In addition, Warshawsky underlines that Piketty “severely understates the role of entrepreneurs and overstates the role of inheritance in the creation of wealth”(10). He gives an example: “in the United States, mega-billionaires like Bill Gates and Warren Buffet did not inherit their assets and are setting up charitable foundations to receive those assets for the benefit of future generations”.  However, both Piketty and Stiglitz have “demystify” the self-made man legend. Piketty “attributes the rise of top income shares in the United States over the 1980–2010 period mainly to rising inequality in access to skills and higher education” (17).  Stiglitz in a more precise way has remarked that some entrepreneurs have amassed their wealth through monopolies: “Gates got his money through monopoly power, and Slim got his money through monopoly power in Telemex”. 

In general terms, it can be told that Stiglitz and Piketty have more coincidences than differences. Stiglitz it’s not far from the Piketty’s thrust, rather he complements the points that Piketty suggests. At the end, both consider institutions and redistributive policies as core variables of tackling inequality. Meanwhile, regarding Warshawsky, it can be stated that they have a more evident tension, mainly that involves the debates over inheritance and entrepreneurship and over taxation as an effective tool against inequality.

The validity of the critics

In a certain way, it has been suggested the validity of those critics.  Although the Piketty’s work is impressive, painstaking and sound, it has some limitations. Of course, it’s impossible to pretend an omni-comprehensive book and in the case of inequality particularly it’s an illusion to take into account all the variables at stake. For sure, inequality is an endless reflection.

On the one hand, as it was mentioned before, concerning to the Stiglitz assessment, that doesn’t pose deep difference respect to Piketty’s thrust.  It can be said that Piketty and Stiglitz have the same starting point: questioning the capital as an immutable concept; also, they share the same arrival point, that is, the necessity of an effective policy design to tackle inequality and to regulate wealth accumulation.

Notwithstanding, as Stiglitz has underpinned the increase in the value of land and monopolies have constituted serious factors in deepening inequality. If the Piketty’s book it’s carefully read it can be observed that less than ten times the word “monopoly” appears in it. In that sense, it can be assumed that this factor has been disregarded by Piketty. And, it has been remarked by Stiglitz, “the new era of monopoly is here”. Monopolies have promoted the rapid concentration of income and wealth.  

On the other hand, the Warshawsky’s example of retirement savings as a demonstration of non-inheritance-oriented capital accumulation is fairly misguided.  First, the Piketty’s main thesis is not essentially about the use of that accumulated wealth, even though he establishes some patterns in the accumulation process and underlines the predator role of a sort of patrimonial capitalism. Second, in the case of retirement savings could be said it’s only anecdotal evidence that limits the possibility of a comprehensive generalization.

Finally, the desirable results of “entrepreneurship” as a variable to reduce inequality are still marginal, as several reports, surveys and rankings have demonstrated. Being a rich entrepreneur is more an exception than a general law. Of course, it’s needed to encourage that idea, but that depends more on institutional conditions than individual tenacity. 

Inequality as the undeniable debate

The most conservative economists have interpreted the book as a sort of an ideologised research. They have insisted on the existence of social mobility across the centuries.  Nevertheless, historical data has contradicted those assumptions or at least, it has cast them doubt. 

Certainly, it’s undeniable that inequality has steady growth in last ten years.  An OXFAM Report, presented in January 2016, has clearly depicted that reality: “The richest 1% now have more wealth than the rest of the world combined”. Therefore, it’s not surprising that the Piketty’s book has set out some guidelines for the debate.

It’s not an outlandish hypothesis to say that an unregulated free-market have had a natural tendency to promote the increase of wealth concentration as Piketty suggests throughout his book. Rather, it can be easily tested around the world. The free-market for some economists has become more a dogma than a paradigm, and it’s not the case of Piketty.  

Also, what it’s clear is that inequality in wealth and inequality of opportunities are strongly intertwined.  As Stiglitz and Piketty have depicted, the top universities in the United States have elevated its tuition fees in an astronomic way. Nowadays, those institutions are more unaffordable than ever.  Education is a public good and it must not be privatized.

Although Piketty attempts to go further in giving a new response to tackle this soaring inequality, namely, the progressive global income tax, it could be quite utopian.  Certainly, new regulations and limits to wealth accumulation are essential, but first, they must be implemented at domestic level.  

However, in the international arena, some initiatives have started to gain ground, for example, the United Nations, some NGO’s and governments have started a “crusade” against tax havens.  In the same direction of the Piketty’s claim, they have demanded more transparency.   As most of Piketty’s critics have pointed out the data collected by him are not exact.  For sure, one of the reasons could be that most of part of accumulated wealth has been created under shadows; therefore, it’s difficult to trace back the capital accumulation patterns.  Undoubtedly, lack of transparency has become a hindrance in the struggle against inequality and Piketty has given strong evidence to continue this pathway.